



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME XXXII NUMBER 3

Party Quiz on Foreign Policy

by **Senator William Benton**
Democrat of Connecticut

1. *World Front.* How can the Republicans justify their vote in Congress against Point Four and their consistent attempts to meat-axe appropriations for ECA, military assistance, the Voice of America and other positive programs designed to strengthen the free world against communism? How do they reconcile this record with that of General Dwight D. Eisenhower's?

2. *Western Europe.* In the event of a Republican victory, which Republican wing in the Congress would predominate—the powerful group that agrees with Taft on foreign policy or the far-less influential group that agrees with Eisenhower?

3. *Asia.* Since the Republicans seek to disclaim any responsibility for Far Eastern policy, while claiming a share of the credit for European policy under the so-called bipartisan program, what alternative Far Eastern proposals were made by the Republican leadership during the crucial period preceding the collapse of Chiang Kai-shek?

4. *Military Strength.* What shred of evidence is there that Republican leadership opposed our rapid demobilization after World War II?

by **Senator H. Alexander Smith**
Republican of New Jersey

1. *World Front.* What is the policy of the New Deal-Fair Deal Administration with regard to the containment-liberation issue? Why was General Eisenhower's "liberation by peaceful means" speech designated by President Truman as "war talk"?

2. *Western Europe.* In the light of Republican initiative and participation in the UN, ECA and NATO, what basis is there for the charge that a Republican Administration would be "isolationist"?

3. *Asia.* In view of the loss of China and the failure of the Secretaries of State to visit any Asian country, while visiting Europe 18 times since the end of World War II, how can the Democrats defend the New Deal-Fair Deal Administration's "let the dust settle" policy in China?

4. *Korea.* In June 1949 we withdrew our troops from South Korea. We denied the South Korean forces planes, tanks, antiaircraft and antitank weapons. We publicly announced Korea was "outside the defensive perimeter of the United States" (Secretary Acheson, Press Club, January 1950). Did this not lead the Communists to feel that they could attack and, in effect, invite the war?

OCTOBER 15, 1952

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION INCORPORATED
22 EAST 38TH STREET • NEW YORK 16, NEW YORK

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



The Score in Europe and Asia

On the eve of the conference of United States ambassadors to four Western European governments, which was held in London September 24 to 27, George F. Kennan, United States ambassador to Moscow and one of this country's best-informed experts on Russia, let it be known that he does not hold alarmist views regarding the immediate future so far as the Soviet Union is concerned. According to Harrison Salisbury's report in *The New York Times* of September 19, Mr. Kennan is convinced that "for the time being, at any rate, there is a comparatively small likelihood of new explosions in the already troubled world." A similar view is expressed in a report issued on September 20 by the Committee for Economic Development, a private organization of leaders in business, industry and finance.

Europe More Confident

This estimate of the short-run prospects facing the United States is confirmed by the new mood noticeable in Europe. Now that the Western European nations, thanks in considerable part to Marshall Plan and Mutual Security Program aid, have had an opportunity to get their second wind after World War II, the post-war slump and the fresh strains imposed by the Korean war, they show a marked desire to set their own affairs in order. The democratically

elected governments of Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, the Low Countries and the Scandinavian nations are still beset by many difficulties. But they have succeeded in maintaining themselves in power and are less harassed by pressures from extremists of right and left than at any time since 1945.

The Communists remain strong wherever democratic governments, for a variety of reasons, have as yet failed to satisfy the deep-seated desire of their peoples for at least modest improvements in such matters as land reform, workers' housing, lower prices for essential consumer goods, and so on. But the Western European nations, which have had a centuries-old experience of struggle for liberty against all forms of autocracy, have eliminated remnants of feudalism and now endeavor to give all groups of the population a share in the political and economic life of the community, feel little temptation to solve their problems by a Russian-type Communist dictatorship.

As a result of disillusionment with the policies of the U.S.S.R., and some uncertainty as to the course that should be followed in the future, fissures have appeared in local Communist parties, and in recent tests of strength Communists have suffered significant defeats. The British Trades Union Congress at Margate in September, after giving the

Communists full opportunity to express their hostility to rearmament, voted 3 to 1 in favor of rearming Britain to the fullest extent possible within its means, a decision for which it was congratulated by Winston Churchill. In Sweden's parliamentary elections of September 21 the Communists lost heavily, reducing their seats from 8 in 1948 to 5 today. Perhaps most significant, André Marty and Charles Tillon, veteran French Communists who had favored a policy of violence, were dropped by the French Communist party from top party posts for "fractionism" but, contrary to the party's expectations, refused to recant.

Now that the passions of the post-war period, with its seismic readjustments, have abated, Laborites and Socialists on the one hand, and far-sighted Conservatives on the other, particularly in Britain, find that they share a larger area of agreement on basic issues than they had thought possible. Neither side is prepared to go to extremes or expects to achieve its objectives one hundred per cent. Many Laborites no longer advocate "class warfare" or regard nationalization as a universal panacea. Many Conservatives no longer resent political cooperation with the trade unions or regard *laissez faire* as a cure-all for economic ills. The United States, once regarded as a bulwark of reactionary capitalism, is now acknowl-

Published twice a month by the FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, INC., 22 E. 38th St., New York 16, N.Y., U.S.A. EDITORIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE: SPRUILLE BRADEN • J. BARTLET BREBNER • HENRY STEELE COMMAGER • JOHN MARSHALL • PHILIP E. MOSELY • ANNA LORD STRAUSS • SUMNER WELLES. BROOKS EMENY, *President*; VERA MICHELES DEAN, *Editor*; BLAIR BOLLES, *Washington Correspondent*; FELICE NOVICH, *Assistant Editor*. • *The Foreign Policy Association contributes to public understanding by presenting a cross section of views on world affairs. The Association as an organization takes no position on international issues. Any opinions expressed in its publications are those of the authors.* • Subscription Rates: \$4.00 a year; single copies 20 cents. Re-entered as second-class matter September 26, 1951 at the post office at New York, N.Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Please allow one month for change of address. Contents of this BULLETIN may be reproduced with credit to the Foreign Policy Association.

347

Produced under union conditions and composed, printed and bound by union labor.

edged by many Laborites, notably John Strachey, secretary of war in the former British Labor cabinet and an erstwhile critic of American economic practices, as a nation whose capitalism is in "progressive development."

The emergence of this middle ground, whose previous absence had facilitated the gains of extremist groups, may bring about in Western Europe a "new liberalism." This "new liberalism" is based on recognition by most non-Communist parties, and also by the Vatican, that labor must have an opportunity to participate in political life, just as the middle class won this opportunity in the 19th century, and that in a modern industrial society all citizens have a stake in the well-being of the community as a whole.

Unity and Trade

The gradual internal stabilization of the Western European nations has made it possible for them to discuss with greater peace of mind the prospects of a union within whose confines, it is hoped, they might ultimately enjoy an increased measure of security, employment and productivity. The decision of the Schuman Plan Assembly to start drafting plans for a political union marks an important step in that direction. It would be idle to expect that a Western European union can be forged overnight. Many problems remain, among which the Franco-German controversy over the Saar and the conflict over Trieste between Italy and Yugoslavia (which is not a member of NATO) are the most acute.

The significant thing is that the Western Europeans, undeterred by the warnings of British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden at the Strasbourg meeting of the Council of Europe about the danger of German domination over the proposed union,

are seriously considering united action. Among their reasons for seeking unity is the desire to reduce their current dependence on the military and economic aid of the United States. The slogan of British Chancellor of the Exchequer Richard A. Butler, "Trade, not aid," has made a deep impression not only on Britain but also on other Western European nations.

While Western Europe seeks economic strength in regional unity, Britain is examining the possibilities of finding greater self-sufficiency through close ties with the Commonwealth countries. Both the United

What Do You Think?

How would *you* answer the questions asked by the two distinguished Senators on the front page? Write us your answers to either one by October 24 in an 800-word article. We shall publish the two best articles—one answering Senator Benton and one answering Senator Smith.

States and Europe will watch the results of the financial discussions held by the Commonwealth nations in London during September for signs whether Britain will now experiment with self-sufficiency, as urged by the London *Observer*, or seek salvation in expanded international trade.

If, as Ambassador Kennan believes, war is not in prospect for the immediate future, Western Europe, now that it no longer feels defenseless, will look beyond the short-run problems of recovery and rearmament toward a long-term economic program. Thoughtful Europeans realize that even if they achieve a Western union, they will be unable to live a self-contained existence. On September 25 the Consultative Assembly of the

Council of Europe approved a plan under which its members will pool their resources for the development of the colonies and dominions of European nations. The Europeans also hope that once our elections are over, the new Administration will give serious consideration to the possibilities of coordinating the needs of the United States for markets and raw materials with those of its allies in Western Europe. The European nations do not expect that miracles can be wrought in expanding American imports. But Americans, they feel, must realize that our enormous production potential, which requires increasing imports of raw materials, as the Paley committee pointed out in June, places on us a great responsibility for helping to maintain the economies of non-Communist nations on an even keel.

This, they feel, must be done not merely through grants or gifts, which over the long run may have a demoralizing effect on nations determined to maintain their self-respect, but through genuine commercial intercourse and constructive capital investment. Otherwise some of the less favorable symptoms that are appearing in Western Europe—decline in production, slump in employment, reduction in imports—may undermine the good results achieved to date in restoring the confidence of our Western allies. Should this prove to be the case, the short-term prospects might be less promising than Ambassador Kennan foresees, even if Russia does not resort to war.

The score, then, is for the moment good in Western Europe. There a highly industrialized area, although devastated by war, possessed the industrial and agricultural facilities and the skilled manpower to make a quick recovery with American aid. How does the score look in Asia?

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The first of two articles)



The Parties' Record in Congress

THE REPUBLICAN RECORD

by August Heckscher

Mr. Heckscher is assistant chief editorial writer of the New York *Herald Tribune* and author of *A Pattern of Politics* (New York, Harcourt, 1947). The *Herald Tribune* is supporting General Dwight D. Eisenhower.

THE record of the Republicans in foreign policy must be read against the simple fact that the party has been in the opposition and that very little effort toward bipartisanship has been made by either side since the death of Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg. It is to be expected that the opposition will oppose—particularly that it will try to harry—the Administration by amendments restricting power and limiting funds. Theoretically it can be argued that the nation's good must take precedence over every other consideration. In fact, however, the two-party system justifies and even necessitates a certain amount of obstruction.

An examination of key votes from 1949 to 1952 in the Senate and House shows a fairly definite pattern. The Republicans go along with the major decisions, after making things as uncomfortable as they can in the early stages. At the end, however, there remains a hard core of Republican extremists. These oppose everything from Point Four to the Japanese peace pact. They are the real isolationists, and any prognostication for a possible Republican Administration must take into account the degree to which this extremist core can expect to hold or to increase its power.

Opposition and Support

A few examples will establish the pattern. Ratification of the North Atlantic pact, July 21, 1949, was supported by 32 Republicans and opposed to the end by 11. Among these latter are the familiar names of Kem, Langer, Malone, Jenner and Wat-

kins. Passage of the European Aid Bill, August 31, 1951, found only five Republicans opposed; but an earlier crucial vote to trim \$500 million from the fund was supported by 26 Republicans. Renewal of the President's power to make reciprocal trade pacts, in September 1949, found the Republicans in the Senate split in almost even numbers, with 15 in favor and 18 against. However, on the so-called "peril point amendment," the Republicans closed ranks to support provisions which many believed might hamstring effective action in this field.

Voting figures alone cannot tell the policy of a party. Such figures may, for example, register more accurately the degree of partisanship than the degree of isolation in a particular group. The proposals of the party's leaders are a better indication of policy; but in the American system the lack of leadership among the party out of power is notorious. For recent years it seems fair to say that Republicans in Congress, except for the totally unconverted few, have shown themselves ready to acquiesce in the main outlines of responsible internationalist foreign programs. As to what the Republicans might do if they hold the Presidency, the following three factors need to be taken into consideration:

1. *The position of the Republican candidate, General Dwight D. Eisenhower.* The general has been firm in maintaining the main lines of internationalism. Nevertheless, it has not been clear at what levels he would set appropriations for foreign aid. Nor has it been clear to what extent

he would maintain the reciprocal trade policies of the present Administration. Judging by his speeches to date, he would give more weight than is currently being given to considerations of reducing total spending, and would probably give a higher priority to satisfying domestic interests.

2. *The position of Senator Robert A. Taft.* Whatever the result of the elections, Senator Taft will remain at the head of the Senate Republicans. He has stated that differences on foreign policy between himself and General Eisenhower are "matters of degree"—a statement that seems somewhat optimistic in view of his basic opposition to the North Atlantic pact. Yet it should not be forgotten that under Vandenberg's tutelage Mr. Taft showed himself a good deal more reasonable than when he felt impelled to take the lead himself in foreign policy. Party loyalty should make it possible for him to go a considerable way in accepting the initiatives of a Republican President.

3. *The effect of the elections on Senate Republicans.* Of the confirmed isolationists, a high proportion is up for re-election. Of these, a number appear to have poor chances of being returned to Washington. Kem will have a hard fight against Symington in Missouri, and Jenner a hard fight against Governor Schricker in Indiana. Watkins, Malone, Eaton and Cain are all up—and all, apparently, in some difficulty. Brewster has already been retired by the Maine voters. Bricker's re-election may be secured as a result of Senator Taft's

(Continued on page 6)

THE DEMOCRATIC RECORD

by Helen Fuller

Miss Fuller is managing editor of *The New Republic* and writes extensively on national politics. *The New Republic* is supporting Governor Adlai E. Stevenson.

IT IS a sad reflection on the fading image of Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, but nevertheless a statistical fact, that President Truman has had to rely heavily on the party discipline of the Democrats to get through the major legislation on which our foreign policy rests. During the last Congress whenever that discipline, never very strong, cracked as the result of the various Southern "rebellions," election-year absences and response to the business community's demand for "economy," then the vital margins disappeared, and measures like the Mutual Security bill and the Reciprocal Trade Agreements act were sent to the White House in badly damaged form.

Support of Foreign Policy

On the whole, though, the Democrats have lived up to their responsibility. They have upheld the President on his major foreign policy requests and given far better support to the requests for military and economic aid for Europe made by the man who was to become the opposition standard-bearer than did the Republicans. Of the 37 Senators who heeded General Dwight D. Eisenhower's warning that a cut of more than \$1 billion in the MSA bill "would require a drastic revision of the whole program," 27 were Democrats. Of the 56 Senators who in April 1951 put an end to the debate over sending more American troops to Europe by rejecting a crippling amendment by Senator John W. Bricker, no less than 43 were Democrats.

As every Washington observer

knows, it is these votes on the vital amendments, and not the votes on final passage of disputed legislation, which best indicate the degree of support for a policy on Capitol Hill. An analysis of the most crucial of these votes shows that for the past two years, at least, Administration foreign policy has had the support of more than three-quarters of the Democrats in Congress and less than one-quarter of the Republicans.

House Republicans are slightly more internationalist than their colleagues in the Senate, and Senate Democrats are somewhat less likely to vote against the Administration on foreign policy questions than are Democratic Representatives, but the basic ratios are similar. In the Senate the Democrats gave the Administration an average of 75 percent support on such marginal roll-calls as the troops-to-Europe issue, Indian aid, the Mutual Security Program and Point Four. In the House 83 percent of the Democrats supported the Administration position on the last three programs, as well as on extension of the reciprocal trade program in 1951. The Republican scores for support of these programs were 25 and 20 percent respectively.

Lack of Leadership

The Democratic performance occurred without the help of dynamic leadership in Congress. Senator Tom Connally, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, faltered noticeably in his leadership role during the period when he was considering running for re-election in Texas, and although quick-witted

and an able debater, he was never a topnotch leader. In the House James Richards, Democrat of South Carolina, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, has proved himself an able chairman and compromiser, but has yet to achieve real stature among his colleagues. Connally's retirement would give the nominal Senate leadership to 85-year-old Senator Theodore F. Green, Democrat of Rhode Island, in the event of a Democratic victory this year. With the loss of Senator Brien McMahon, should John Sparkman be elevated to the Vice-Presidency and two other Foreign Relations Committee members, H. Alexander Smith and Cabot Lodge, be defeated for re-election, that committee would badly need able replacements from both parties.

The success of the Democratic ticket in November would mean the continuation of many of the Administration's policies of past years. John Foster Dulles' attack on "containment" is likely to reaffirm Democratic support of the basic lines along which Dean Acheson has guided the nation. Stevenson's election would, however, give the American people, and the Democrats, really articulate leadership. President Truman, while he has made courageous decisions at critical times and has sent well-written messages to Congress, has not been able to present the complex issues underlying his foreign policy in an inspiring way. Stevenson, with his experience as a diplomat, his understanding of moral issues as well as power politics and his obvious gifts for expression, should be able to make the voice of America more coherent and meaningful, here as well as abroad. In his task he would be ably assisted by a Vice-Presidential candidate who has served as a delegate to United Nations conferences and has experience in the

(Continued on page 6)

Heckscher

(Continued from page 4)

efforts to stir up his followers in Ohio to full participation in the campaign. Meanwhile, of the firmly internationalist group, only Senator Lodge seems to have his seat in serious jeopardy. Smith of New Jersey will be a loss as a reasonably consistent ally of his side if he should go down in his contest against former Undersecretary of the Army, Archibald Alexander.

Without the Republican extremists in the Senate, a new Republican Administration would, of course, have to form a coalition with elements of the opposition party. Even if partisanship should run high among the Democrats, there is little doubt but that an internationalist Republican President should be able to secure the support he would need.

In summary, it may be said that Republicans have been roughly divided between those who backed and those who did not back the recent foreign programs. Effective White House leadership would bring at

least 75 percent of the Republicans over to the internationalist side; and the remaining minority may be cut down by the action of the voters in November.

Fuller

(Continued from page 5)

writing of foreign policy legislation.

On foreign policy the Democrats in Congress have been relatively unified in support of the Administration. Southern disaffection has made inroads on this unity, but even the 42 Southern Congressmen who voted against the reciprocal trade program pose nothing like the problem which the Republicans face within their ranks. What the Democrats need is leadership and a chance to work out the differences among them which are susceptible of compromise. This the election of Stevenson and Sparkman could give. With a closer working relationship between Congress and the Administration, and especially between Congress and the State Department, the Democrats should be able to carry on a positive foreign

policy, whether or not another Vandenberg arises to guide the Republicans.

FPA Bookshelf

The Army Air Forces in World War II, Volume III, Europe: Argument to V-E Day, January 1944 to May 1945, by the Historical Division, United States Air Force, and edited by Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1951. \$6.

This volume, the third of a projected seven-volume series, continues the story of the Army Air Forces in the European and Mediterranean theaters. The air war, from ARGUMENT (the code word for the attack on the German aircraft industry) to V-E Day, is depicted. Included in the appraisal of the importance of the Air Force in the victory of the Allies are accounts of the development of strategic bombing campaigns, of tactical air operations supporting the invasion armies, as well as descriptions of the support of Continental underground operations and Air Force activities based in Italy.

The Struggle for Europe, by Chester Wilmot. New York, Harper, 1952. \$5.

In this purposefully controversial book an Australian World War II correspondent now working with the British Broadcasting Corporation challenges some of the principal wartime military and political decisions of the United States. This book has received a great deal of favorable comment in Britain, where it has had an unprecedented sale.

WASHINGTON NEWS LETTER



Candidates Question Foreign Policy

A striking feature of the Presidential election campaign is the emergence of a basic difference of opinion between the two candidates about the foreign policy the United States should follow. Since they not only disagree with each other but apparently also with the present character of foreign policy, it seems likely that the campaign is a prelude to some kind of change in policy no matter who wins the election.

The Issues in Debate

A few months ago it seemed improbable that foreign policy would

come into question during this campaign. Before their convention Republicans were divided as to whether they should nominate a man who had made no criticisms about the policy of the Democratic Administration, or one who favored drastic change. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was put forward as the man who would safeguard American security by carrying on existing policy much in its present form. Many of his articulate supporters held that the foreign policy problem of the United States lay not in the substance of policy but in the way the policy was

executed—or botched, as some critics claimed.

Now that General Eisenhower has won the nomination, he is making it clear that he does not agree with the substance of present policy. He condemns the policy of "containment" and would substitute for it a policy of "liberation," meaning that he favors positive steps to end the hegemony of the U.S.S.R. over the Eastern European nations. He has not defined the steps he would take to carry out liberation but has declared he does not intend to go to war to make liberation possible.

Governor Adlai Stevenson has revealed that he, too, is not ready to swallow present foreign policy whole. In place of rigid containment, he has recommended negotiations to ease this country's relations with Russia. In place of the deadlock in our relations with Communist China, he has urged a more conciliatory attitude than the one the White House and State Department have taken during the past two years. At bottom his attitude on China represents disagreement with the Republican party rather than with the State Department; for the present China policy was adopted by the State Department in response to the urging of Republican members of Congress.

The views expressed by General Eisenhower and Governor Stevenson give in outline the main foreign policy issues of the campaign. However, each candidate, while urging the United States to seek different goals, recommends, on the whole, the use of the foreign policy methods now followed by the Administration. At Philadelphia on September 4, for example, General Eisenhower urged that we have allies in Europe, South America, the Middle East, Asia and Africa; that we give unwavering support to the United Nations; that we nurture a strong, increasingly productive economy; that we maintain strong military forces and seek general disarmament. All those instruments are now available to the present Administration, with the one exception of allies in the Middle East; and even there this gap is partly filled if Turkey is considered to be in the Middle East. The one new method General Eisenhower has recommended is that we give aid to the peoples of countries enslaved by the U.S.S.R., including, apparently, China as well as Eastern Europe.

Republican spokesmen show a growing interest in aiding the peo-

ples of Eastern Europe so as to strengthen them in relation to their governments. The Republican party contends that the present Administration is to blame for the plight of the peoples living under the Communist governments friendly to the Kremlin. "Seven years after victory in World War II, this Administration has bungled us perilously close to World War III," General Eisenhower said in Philadelphia. "Now for seven years men, women and children at the appalling rate of 100 million a year have been delivered into slavery" under communism.

How to Use Strength

Governor Stevenson has pointed out that General Eisenhower advocates methods already in use to achieve something new in the way of foreign policy. "The Republican party," he said in San Francisco on

September 9, "indorses the nation's foreign policies and promises to save you at the same time from such enlightened bungling." On September 1 in Grand Rapids he praised the present elements of policy: "The essential direction of our foreign policy is right—building the unity and collective strength of the free countries to prevent the expansion of Soviet dominion and control over one nation after another."

The root of the foreign policy issue is: What shall we do with the strength we are building up? Shall we use it to break up the Soviet empire by methods short of war? Or, with confidence born of our strength, shall we try to negotiate with the Soviet Union on outstanding issues? These are the questions, basically at stake in the Presidential campaign.

BLAIR BOLLES

Statement Required by the Act of August 24, 1912, as amended by the acts of March 3, 1933, and July 2, 1946 (Title 39, United States Code, Section 233) showing the Ownership, Management, and Circulation of

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN.

Published semimonthly at New York, N.Y. for October 1, 1952.

1. The names and addresses of the publisher, editor, managing editor, and business managers are: Publisher—Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated, 22 East 38 Street, New York 16, N.Y.; Editor—Vera Micheles Dean, 22 East 38 Street, New York 16, N.Y.; Managing editor—None; Business manager—None.

2. The owner is: (If owned by a corporation, its name and address must be stated and also immediately thereunder the names and addresses of stockholders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of stock. If not owned by a corporation, the names and addresses of the individual owners must be given. If owned by a partnership or other unincorporated firm, its name and address, as well as that of each individual member, must be given.) Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated, 22 East 38 Street, New York 16, N.Y.; Brooks Emeny, President, 22 East 38 Street, New York 16, N.Y.; Eustace Seligman, Treasurer, 48 Wall Street, New York 5, N.Y.; Thomas L. Power, Vice-President, 22 East 38 Street, New York 16, N.Y.

3. The known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 percent or more of the total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities are: None.

4. Paragraphs 2 and 3 include, in cases where the stockholder or security holder appears upon the books of the company as trustee or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the person or corporation for whom such trustee is acting; also the statements in the two paragraphs show the affiant's full knowledge and belief as to the circumstances and conditions under which stockholders and security holders who do not appear upon the books of the company as trustees, hold stock and securities in a capacity other than that of a bona fide owner.

5. The average number of copies of each issue of this publication sold or distributed, through the mails or otherwise, to paid subscribers during the 12 months preceding the date shown above was: (This information is required from daily, weekly, semi-weekly, and triweekly newspapers only.)

VERA M. DEAN, Editor.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 3rd day of September, 1952.

[SEAL]

CAROLYN E. MARTIN, Notary Public for the State of New York. Qualified in New York County, No. 31-2602600. (My commission expires March 30, 1953.)



FPA Bookshelf

BOOKS ON ASIA

Young Pakistan, by Rafiq M. Khan and Herbert S. Stark. London and New York, Oxford University Press, 1951. \$2.

This small book, full of enthusiasm for the achievements of the new state of Pakistan, is designed as a citizenship reader for Pakistani secondary schools and adult institutions. It contains a good deal of factual information presented in simple language.

China, Japan and the Powers, by Meribeth E. Cameron, Thomas H. D. Mahoney and George E. McReynolds. New York, Ronald Press, 1952. \$6.50.

An excellent, well-balanced work which, although designed for college students, should be of interest to the general reader who wants background information on issues of current concern in the Far East. The authors are professors of history at Mount Holyoke, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the University of Connecticut, respectively.

The Years That Were Fat, by George N. Kates. New York, Harper, 1952. \$3.75.

This unusually interesting volume by an American schooled in the Chinese language and in knowledge of China is full of delightful glimpses of life in Peking, where the author spent seven years which he records with insight and delight.

The Hidden Story of the Korean War, by I. F. Stone. New York, Monthly Review Press, 1952. \$5.

The author, known for his contributions on domestic and foreign affairs to *The Nation*, *PM* and *The Daily Compass*, analyzes United Nations reports and news dispatches from Korea since the outbreak of war in 1950 and arrives at some unorthodox conclusions about the Korean situation. Some of the questions have seldom been discussed in the press.

BOOKS ON U.S. POLICY

The Future of American Politics, by Samuel Lubell. New York, Harper, 1952. \$3.50.

This unusually illuminating study of political trends in this country during the past 20 years is "must" reading in an election year.

American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power, by John Kenneth Galbraith. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1952. \$3.

A lively book, by one of our most stimulating economists, which should help the general reader to understand the workings of twentieth-century free enterprise in the United States.

Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois, A Portrait, by Noel F. Busch. New York, Farrar, Straus, 1952. \$3.75.

Mr. Busch's volume is interesting and useful, particularly because it not only contains valuable background information about Governor Stevenson, the Democratic nominee for President, but also includes a compilation of speeches and articles by him which define his attitude on the many vital issues at stake in the United States today.

PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRACY

Philosophy of Democratic Government, by Yves R. Simon. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1951. \$3.50.

Dr. Simon, professor of philosophy of social thought at the University of Chicago, elucidates his theory of democratic government with keen insight and judgment, discussing proportional representation, the role of political parties, propaganda, equality of opportunity, and many other institutions affecting democratic life. This is the second in a series of volumes sponsored by the Walgreen Foundation, which aims to present a complete understanding of democracy based on firm, reasonable principles.

Constitutions and Constitutional Trends Since World War II, edited by Arnold J. Zurcher. New York, New York University Press, 1951. \$5.

In this useful volume several leading authorities on comparative government examine significant aspects of postwar public law with particular reference to the new constitutions of Western Europe, the texts of which are included in the appendices together with the Statute of the Council of Europe and the Statute of Westminster. Particularly interesting is the chapter by Professor Karl Lowenstein of Amherst College on "The Value of Constitutions in Our Revolutionary Age."

Democracy and the Economic Challenge, by Robert M. MacIver. New York, Knopf, 1952. \$2.50.

In these five lectures delivered for the William W. Cook Foundation at the University of Michigan, Professor MacIver, distinguished sociologist and political philosopher of Columbia University, points out ways in which democracy can meet the problems of modern society. In his opinion capitalism and socialism are not irreconcilable.

Within Our Power, by Raymond B. Fosdick. New York, Longmans, 1952. \$1.75.

In his tiny book of 114 pages Mr. Fosdick, former president of the Rockefeller Foundation, challenges the pessimism of our age and encourages everyone to face with courage the problems and dangers that beset us.

The Spirit of Liberty, by Learned Hand. New York, Knopf, 1952. \$3.50.

This collection of the papers and addresses of Judge Learned Hand assembled by Irving Dillard, who also contributes an introduction and notes, presents a distillation of the wisdom of a distinguished jurist who has done much to interpret the significance of liberty in the modern world.

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

22 East 38th Street
New York 16, New York

In the next issue

A Foreign Policy Report

**Pakistan: New Hope
in the Middle East**

by Jerome B. Cohen, former Chief of the
South Asia Branch, Office of Intelligence
Research, Department of State

CASE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
MAIN BLDG. - LIBR. LS-3
10900 EUCLID AVE.
CLEVELAND 6, OHIO